Alberta Rules of Court Annotated is a unique collection of all the rules of civil procedure you need to practice before every court in Alberta. Selected and significant case law aid your understanding of the rules, and pinpoint references to quoted pages help ensure efficiency.
This invaluable reference tool contains the full text of all the rules, as amended, that govern procedure in Alberta courts. Includes direct quotations from all significant decisions that interpret or apply the rules, practice directions issued by the court, cross-references to related rules, and a comprehensive index.
Also includes the Alberta Civil Practice Advisor (available upon request), a monthly email supplement of key practice cases, free with a standing order subscription.
New in this edition
The legislation in this publication has been updated to Alberta Gazette Vol. 117:06 (March 31, 2021).
Updates to legislation include:
- Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2010 as amended to Alta. Reg. 23/2021
- The Surrogate Rules, Alta. Reg. 130/95 as amended to Alta. Reg. 37/2020
Practice notes and notices to the profession have been added and/or updated.
This new edition also contains updated commentary and case law, including:
- Geophysical Service Incorporated v. Plains Midstream Canada ULC, 2021 ABCA 55 (Rule 3.61) -- The Court said: “Particulars” are, by definition, further details about the claim originally If they go beyond that, they are potentially “new” claims which must comply with s. 6(2). A plaintiff cannot indirectly add new claims to a proceeding by describing them as particulars.
- Stuve v. Stuve, 2020 ABCA 467(Rule 4.16) – “We conclude that the Rules of Court, in particular rule 4.16, do not empower a Court of Queen's Bench judge to order private arbitration of disputes without consent of the parties or an agreement to that effect.”
- Covey v. Devon Canada Corporation, 2020 ABCA 4455 (Rule 4.33) – “[R]espondent’s argument is that under r 4.33, the court “must dismiss” the action if “3 or more years have passed without a significant advance”. If 4.33 said “more than 3 years” or that the court must dismiss the action if there is no significant advance “within 3 years”, service of the affidavit of records on May 12, 2018 would have been within the required period. However, r 4.33 sets the drop-dead date at three years from the last significant advance; therefore, the respondent argues, the significant advance must take place earlier than three years since the last significant advance. The respondent acknowledges that the jurisprudence contains some passing references to the deadline being less than three years, but that no court has addressed the issue head on: see Ursa at para 11 referring to “prior to the expiration of three years” or Maurice v Matchett, 2016 ABQB 704 at para 49 referring to “3 years less a day”…We disagree with the respondent’s position. Under r 4.33, the three years have to “have passed”.
- P & C Law Firm Management Inc. v. Sabourin, 2020 ABCA 449 (Rule 7.3) -- “Fairness, in the Weir-Jones context, requires consideration of the state of the record. Are material facts in dispute? If so, the adjudicator may not be able to “fairly resolve the dispute”, the language utilized in Weir-Jones. “[T]he court must be satisfied that the determination of the dispute without making available to a party all stages of the litigation spectrum is just”. O’Hanlon Paving Ltd v Serengetti Developments Ltd, 2013 ABQB 428, para 41, 18 BLR (5th) 73.”
- Tallcree First Nation v. Rath & Company, 2020 ABCA 433 -- The law firm had entered into a contingency agreement with its client and an account was rendered. The client applied under Rule 10.13 for a review of the contingency agreement to determine whether the contingency fee was reasonable under Rule 10.9. The Review Officer held the fee was reasonable; the client appealed that decision to a chambers judge who revoked the Review Officer’s decision. The law firm wanted to appeal the chambers judge’s order, and sought “a declaration confirming that they have a right to appeal that decision because it is not a decision ‘as to costs only’, or, if it is a decision ‘as to costs only’, for permission to appeal.” Madam Justice Khullar is quoted regarding the question of whether the decision about the contingency fee was “as to costs only”.